This work empirically investigates the effect of the amount of time provided the broker to market property (listing contract length) on the likelihood of a successful marketing attempt. Do shorter listing contracts increase broker motivation or can contracts be so short that marketing efforts are unlikely to result in a successful transaction? The empirical results demonstrate that when the broker is provided a longer listing contract, the likelihood of a successful transaction increases but at a decreasing rate. This result suggests that home sellers face a tradeoff when choosing contract length. Longer contracts provide more time to arrange a successful sale, but reduction in broker motivation reduces the probability of sale as contracts lengthen.
A significant portion of the residential transaction literature is devoted to the determinants of property marketing time. Highlighted originally in Cubbin (1974) and Miller (1978) , transaction price and property marketing time have been shown to be simultaneously determined. In fact, the vast majority of recent residential works dedicated to some effect of a predictor variable on either transaction price or marketing time model these two transaction outcomes simultaneously.' A third transaction outcome (likelihood of a transaction during a given marketing period) has been nearly universally ignored. The lack of coverage in this area seems to be due to data paucity and/or highly liquid residential markets. Until recently residential studies did not incorporate unsuccessful marketing efforts into their analysis, suggesting a lack of access to the necessary data. Additionally, the recent residential market boom made the study of unsold properties rather uninteresting as virtually all properties transacted in relatively short periods of time. However, in a less liquid market, the modeling of the causes of tmsold properties can provide valuable insight into the success or failure of real estate transactions.
A recent paper by Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2008) provides the base empirical model for the determinants of property transaction likelihood during a given marketing period. We follow that methodology by estimating a logistic regression model of sold and unsold properties, but extend it by making the original empirical investigation into the impact of listing period length on the likelihood of a transaction. Specifically, "How does the amount of time allotted to a broker to market a property impact the likelihood of a successful marketing effort?"Û tilizing logistic regression analysis of the property marketing outcome, empirical results of this study indicate that the likelihood of a sale increases at a decreasing rate as listing contracts lengthen. When the analysis focuses on categories of contract lengths, findings indicate that contracts of 90 days or less display a significant decrease in their likelihood of achieving a successful outcome relative to other listing period lengths.
These findings may provide tactical advice to both sellers of property and listing brokers. In the case of the former, sellers face a tradeoff when choosing the optimal contract length for their property. Longer contracts may offer more time to arrange a successful transaction, but the likelihood of a sale advantage decreases significantly as contracts lengthen. In the case of brokers, the results clearly indicate that relatively short listing periods produce a significant decrease in the likelihood of an earned commission and thus lower overall expected income for brokers. An additional implication arises from a recent study by Waller, Brastow, and Johnson (2010) , who analyze the incentive effects of listing contract length. They find that shorter contract periods are associated with shorter time on market, a result that is entirely consistent with Miceli's (1989) theoretical framework in which shorter contracts serve to increase broker effort.
The remainder of this manuscript provides sections on the extant literature and further motivation for this work, data description and discussion, model specification and empirical results, and concluding remarks.
Literature and Motivation
While there is wide acceptance that a relationship exists between transaction price and property marketing time, the real estate literature has not reached a consensus about the optimal estimation technique, the magnitude of the relationship, or even its sign. Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2008) survey 18 empirical studies published between 1995 and 2007.' Their Exhibit 1 succinctly displays the inconsistency of results. Of 45 estimates in which time on the market (TOM) is modeled as an explanatory variable of sales price, 7 found that longer TOM is associated with higher price, 27 show a negative relationship, and in 11 equations the relationship was not statistically significant. Of the 60 estimates in which TOM is the dependent variable and sales price is a regressor, 22 found that higher price results in longer TOM, 25 display a negative relationship, and 13 found the relationship to be statistically insignificant.
What could be causing these statistical inconsistencies? Zuehlke (1987) and Anglin (2006) provide possible clues and suggestions. Zuehlke (1987) suggests that differences in buyers' and sellers' marginal valuation of property characteristics could lead to an uncoupling between property price and the probability of a transaction occurring. Anglin (2006) points out that A (arrival rate in hazard modeling) is only a valid estimator of property marketing time (I/A) during stable market conditions and suggests that direct examinations of the determinants of transaction likelihood might be more fruitful than marketing time estimation. Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2008) build on Zuehlke (1987) and Anglin (2006) and produce an original specification for the estimation of the likelihood of a transaction for residential real estate. They find that marketing time, seller motivation, certain property attributes, and location all significantly impact the likelihood of a transaction. Benefield and Sirmans (2009) is the second paper to explicitly investigate the probability of a transaction. They investigate the impact of contingent closing costs on three outcome metrics: price, time on market, and probability of sale. They find that seller-directed closing costs do not affect the likelihood of a transaction. Interestingly, both of these papers cite two earlier articles that utilize sold and unsold properties: Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005) and Huang and Rutherford (2007) . These papers incorporate sold and unsold properties into their analysis to serve as controls for possible selection bias rather than as an independently investigated outcome. Miceli (1989) develops the theoretical argument that shorter listing periods (time contractually provided the broker to market property) motivates brokers, leading to higher arrival rates (A) and thus shorter marketing spans (I/A). Waller, Brastow, and Johnson (2010) find robust empirical support for this hypothesis. Utilizing three standard empirical specifications, they find that shorter contracts are associated with shorter time on market, ceteris paribus. But, is there a cost associated with these shorter marketing spans? Could a contract be so short that even a highly motivated broker would have difficulty arranging a successful sale? This paper is motivated by the inconsistent empirical estimation between transaction price and marketing time and by the earlier works of Miceli (1989) , Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2008) , Sirmans (2009), and Waller, Brastow, and Johnson (2010) . It investigates the marginal impact, if any, that the length of a listing contract has on the likelihood of a property transaction. Findings should provide practical evidence that is useful to both brokers and sellers of property in this slumping market, as well as answer the questions posed in the preceding paragraph.
The data set consists of observations of single family residential properties sold, withdrawn or expired between March 2000 and June 2008, and comes from a moderatesized MLS consisting of several counties in central Virginia. The initial data set consisted of a total of 24,509 properties. The MLS data includes the date at which the contract was last extended, but no information about whether the contract had been extended one or more times previous to that date. For those properties, then, it is impossible to definitively determine the original contract length and the number or length of additional extensions. Therefore all properties for which the listing contract had been extended were removed from the data set. Additionally, properties with extreme or illogical values, which may suggest data input error, missing or incomplete data were also excluded, resulting in a final data set consisting of 14,587 observations. Variable names and definitions are provided in Exhibit 1.
Data collected from the MLS include property physical characteristics (square footage, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, fireplace, garage, and age), geographic descriptors (MLS areas), and contract data Oisting contract duration). Other MLS variables include list price, selling price, and days on market (TOM).^ For properties that sold, TOM is measured as the number of days from initial list date through date of sales contract execution. For unsold properties, TOM is measured as the number of days from initial list date to the date of listing contract expiration (essentially length of the listing contract) or withdrawal from the market. In all cases, TOM measures time from date of listing to the end, successful or not, of a marketing effort.
In Exhibit 2, descriptive statistics are given for the full data sample, with a comparison of sold and unsold properties. Approximately two-thirds (9,805/14,587) ofthe properties in the data set were sold. The results of differences in means tests comparing the characteristics of sold and unsold properties reveal a number of statistically significant differences. Sold properties had longer contracts on average and a smaller percentage of sold properties had contracts of 90 days or less. The typical sold properties are smaller (mean = 1,934 sq. ft. vs. 2,056 sq. ft.), newer (26.69 years vs. 28.85 years), and have fewer bedrooms (3.20 vs. 3.29) and bathrooms (2.05 vs. 2.09), but the differences are marginal. In regards to price and marketing duration, sold properties list ($168,487 vs. $208,242) A significantly higher proportion of unsold properties had less than a three-month listing contract (0.14 vs. 0.09), while a higher proportion of sold properties had a greater proportion of properties with a three to four month listing contract (0.19 vs. 0.15) or a four to five month listing contract (0.14 vs. 0.10).
The individual i-tests are suggestive but to accurately investigate the impact of listing period time on the probability of a transaction, predictors must be estimated in the presence of one another.
iViodel Specification and Empirical Results

Specification of Model
Following previous authors, the specification of a probability of sale logistic regression includes regressors that capture TOM, seller motivation, property attributes, property location, and listing contract length. Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2008) utilize a similar specification. They discuss the relationship between hazard functions (A) and estimates of time on market (I/A). They reason that because the hazard function and TOM have an inverse relationship by definition, TOM should have a negative and significant effect on transaction likelihood (SOLD) in a logistic regression. Intuitively, a property's marketing period is less likely to have ended in a successful outcome when that period is longer.
Previous studies have established a relationship between overpricing at listing, an inverse measure of seller motivation, and TOM. Glower, Haurin, and Hendershott (1998) find that sellers who have a planned move date overprice their property by a smaller amount and sell more quickly. Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer (2003) also find a positive relationship between degree of overpricing and TOM. Since longer TOM implies a lower probability of sale over a given time span, degree of overpricing (DOP) is expected to have a negative effect on the probability of sale, holding TOM constant. DOP is measured as the ratio of the natural log of a property's list price over the predicted log list price from a hedonic pricing model. Hedonic list price regression results are not reported here but are available from the authors.
Following Zuehlke (1987) , property, location, and market characteristics are included in the empirical specification. Upon finding few of these effects to be significant in a duration model, Zuehlke (1987) conjectures that property attributes important to implicit price discovery might not be important in the determination of sale probability. He argues that while differences in the marginal valuation of these property characteristics between a seller and potential buyers will itifluence the likelihood that an offer is made or accepted, they cannot be separately identified or estimated and the net effect on sale probabilities is indeterminate. However, because marginal differences in the value of property attributes may persist over the marketing period, they are included as potential explanatory variables in the probability of sale model.
As discussed, theoretical and empirical real estate studies have established a positive relationship between the length of the listing contract (LOC) and TOM. However, as the seller reduces the contract length to motivate broker effort, is there an accompanying reduction in the probability of a sale? In order to determine effects on sale probabilities of differing contract lengths, LOC is expressed in quadratic form to determine whether a non-linear relationship exists. In addition, a dummy variable for sales contracts of 90 days or less is created to test the effect on sale probability of short contracts.
Therefore, the following likelihood model to predict whether a property is sold during its marketing period is estimated using logistic regression: where TOM¡ is a vector controlling for marketing time, DOP¡ controls for seller motivation as defined above, LOC¡ represents length of listing contracts, X^ is a vector of property quality proxies, and L¡ is a vector of location and market controls.' Finally, SOLD is the binary dependent variable representing whether or not the property sold during its marketing period.
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF A TRANSACTION AND THE AMOUNT OF TIME PROVIDED 221 Exhibit 3. Logit Estimation of Likelihood of a Transaction Predictor
LOC
Empirical Analysis
Exhibits 3 and 4 report the results of logistic regressions. In the first model (Exhibit 3), length of contract is expressed in quadratic form to capture a possible nonlinear effect on the likelihood of sale. Time on market and overpricing both are associated with statistically significant and empirically important smaller probabilities of selling. These results support the findings of Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2008) . Properties with sustained marketing periods and those that are overpriced at listing are less likely to seU.
Results from Exhibit 3 clearly indicate that contract length has a statistically significant and economically important effect on sale probability. For all properties, sold and unsold, TOM measures the time elapsed from listing date to the date at which the property is no longer on the market. Holding TOM constant, probability of sale increases, but a decreasing rate. The latter result is consistent with Miceli's (1989) theoretical model and empirical work of Waller, Brastow, and Johnson (2010) that focus on the degree to which contract length motivates broker effort. Longer contracts provide less motivation at a given time and therefore result in potentially declining sale probability. In addition to standard logistic coefficients. Exhibit 3 presents odds ratios and marginal coefficients. The odds ratio reveals that the odds of a sale increase with contract length but the odds increase at a decreasing rate.^ The logistic function is not linear. It is therefore useful to determine the marginal effects of explanatory variables at mean sample values because logistic regression coefficients allow non-linearity. The marginal effects again demonstrate that the probability of a sale increases at a decreasing rate as contract length increases.
To examine this result more closely. Exhibit 4 analyzes the Impact on sale probability of very short (90 days or less) contracts. Here length of listing period is measured by a dummy variable that equals one for each property that was listed with a 90-day or less contract. Very short contracts are associated with a lower probability of sale (coefficient, odds ratio, and marginal effect of -1.15, 0.32, and -0.27, respectively) relative to properties listed with contracts longer than 90 days.
To control for the possible impact of changes in real estate market conditions over the March 2000 to June 2008 sample period, a quarterly time trend is included in quadratic form. The trend, conditioned on other regressors, shows an increasing probability of sale over time in all three logit specifications. The rate of increase diminishes over time, reflecting the cooling and eventual decline of the housing market in 2008.
In contrast to results reported by Zuehlke (1987) , property characteristics are generally significant in explaining sale probability. New homes and properties with fireplaces or additional bathrooms are more likely to sell. Larger homes are associated with lower sale probability.
Conclusion
Prior studies on residential real estate outcome have focused primarily on sales price and duration to a successful sale. While these are important outcomes, perhaps the fimdamental issue is whether or not a property sells at all. Failure to sell imposes time and search costs on all parties: sellers, potential buyers, and their brokers. This paper contributes to a relatively new literature by investigating factors that infiuence the probability of successful sales.
Using data from a different MLS and over a different time period, this study supports findings from Johnson, Benefield, and Wiley (2008) . Marketing efforts for properties that are more overpriced at listing and properties that spend more time on the market are less likely to end in a sale.
One of the choice variables facing a seller when listing their home with a broker is the length of the listing contract. Previous authors have established theory and supporting empirical evidence that shorter contracts lead to greater broker effort and therefore shorter marketing duration for successful sales. By including contract length (specified in quadratic form) in logistic sale probability analysis, we find that short listing contracts are associated with a significantly lower probability of a successful sale. However, the diminishing effect on sale probability as contract length increases is consistent with previous authors' arguments that longer contracts provide less incentive for brokers to exert effort at a given time within the contract period.
An interesting implication of our empirical result is that an optimal contract length may exist. Short contracts may not provide enough time to arrange a successful sale, but long contracts may reduce broker incentives. Future research may be able to untangle these potentially countervailing effects and determine optimal contract lengths for properties and markets with different characteristics. Additionally, future research may be able to determine the probability of sale at any time during the marketing period. The probability of sale literature to date has focused on probabilities at end of the marketing period. Analysis of cumulative probabilities over time for properties with different contract lengths may provide additional insight into the effects identified in this paper.
Endnotes
The literature generally agrees that transaction price and marketing time are determined simultaneously. However, many of the empirical specifications between transaction price and marketing time are not truly jointly estimated. Instead, most of the empirical estimations in these recent works can be more accurately classified as estimating these two transaction outcomes in the presence of each other. The difficulties in identifying a suitable instrumental variable with COV (z, e) = 0 appears to be the most likely reason for these specifications.
(2003), Allen and Dare (2004) , Allen, Faircloth, and Rutherford (2005) , Tumbull, Dombrow, and Sirmans (2006) , Dombrow (2006, 2007) , and Huang and Rutherford (2007) . • * Due to limitations of information reported by the MLS, reported TOM for properties that are relisted may be less than the actual time a property is on the market. For example, if a property does not sell within the initial listing contract duration, the homeowner may choose to relist the property with another broker. In that case, the property would appear in the data as two listings with relatively short TOM. This is common to all studies and is beyond the scope of this study; however, it is an issue worthy of additional research. ' Locational differences in probability of sale are controlled with dummy variables for the six largest areas within the MLS. Area coefficients are not reported in results tables but are available from the authors. '' Odds ratios are greater than one when logistic coefficients are positive. The odds ratio is e^ where ß is the logistic coefficient.
